COP15, the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, has come and gone. Amid all the drama – the leaking of negotiation texts, developing country walk-outs over the ‘killing’ of Kyoto, the exclusion of thousands of accredited participants from the conference centre, violent demonstrations in the street, and the 4am emergency call to Ed Miliband – we now ask ourselves, what was really achieved, and where do we go from here?

Copenhagen’s iconic mermaid – Is there a low carbon future ahead of us?  (Photo by Tim Holland)

 

What was achieved?

Within the main part of the conference, the formal negotiations between national delegations, progress was certainly made. This is illustrated by the content of the Copenhagen Accord – a document ‘noted’ at the final hour by a group representing 49 developed and developing countries, together accounting for over 80% of global emissions.

For the first time, the Accord recognises ‘the scientific view that the increase in global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius’. According to IPCC AR4[1], this is the level beyond which dangerous climate change is expected to occur. In addition, both developed AND developing countries have committed to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, thereby mitigating climate change. By the end of this month, developed nations will submit their quantified economy-wide emission reduction targets (for 2020), while developing nations will submit their nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs). This commitment including both the US and China is unprecedented.

Another major breakthrough was the agreement by developed nations to deliver a substantial financial package to developing countries to support them in mitigating and adapting to climate change. 30 billion US dollars of fast start finance has been pledged for the period 2010-2012, while 100 billion dollars per year is pledged by 2020. This latter figure matches the recommendation of Lord Stern.

The deadlock over monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) was also broken. While previously there was resistance by developing countries (notably China) to allow an international team to review their mitigation actions, the Accord now states that actions will be communicated through National Communications, ‘with provisions for international consultations and analysis’. While China would like to protect its national sovereignty, the US insists on a totally transparent process. Without this clause the US may not have agreed the Accord.

Progress was also made at grassroots level. While political negotiations hung in the balance, I observed positive activity all around me, most notably in the side events. Side events are an informal but highly popular part of the conference where national governments, intergovernmental and observer organisations present on and debate their climate change findings and initiatives. The reason for my optimism is that these events provide a great opportunity for delegates, civil society and academics to exchange ideas and learn from one another, as well as providing an avenue for influencing the formal negotiations (Schroeder & Lovell, forthcoming)[2].

As an example, in an event I attended on community based emission offset projects (run by WECF), project developers and local government officials from around the world had the opportunity to talk to and question each other and relevant UN experts about specific problems they were encountering and what they need from the evolving institutional framework. i.e. capacity building in action.

Aside from the odd case of frostbite, even accredited conference participants left queuing outside the centre were being productive – seizing the opportunity to network and identify potential partners!

 

So what was not achieved?

Back at the top political level, while heads of state managed to secure the Copenhagen Accord, it is clear that this document has some major omissions. This is the disappointing side of the story.

Importantly, we still do not have a legally binding document (or a clear timetable for one) that will include developed and developing country climate change mitigation commitments. Also, while developed country emission reduction targets for 2020 are being included in the Accord, any reference to 2050 commitments and the use of 1990 as a unified base level year have been cut. For the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), even the agreement on a 2°C threshold is a blow – they needed 1.5°C to avoid ‘vanish(ing)’.

Additionally, on a purely anecdotal note, COP15 does not appear to have persuaded any more citizens of the world to support the continuing movement to secure an ambitious and equitable climate deal. People outside the field I spoke to over Christmas about this issue seemed more confused than ever (both about the science and our policy solutions), and were quickly losing faith in anyone’s ability to do anything about this problem.

 

OK – so where do we go from here?

Immediately it is necessary to pressure governments to sign up to the most ambitious mitigation targets/actions possible. In many cases, countries and regions have provided a range of emission targets they are willing to commit to, e.g. 20-30% cut by 2020 in the case of the EU. We need the higher figures. We also need to link these targets to our goal of remaining below 2°C. According to Lord Stern, by adding up the most ambitious emission reduction intentions so far, and of course delivering them, we will be around 2 billion tonnes higher than the overall 2020 goal (approx 44 billion tonnes). That’s pretty good. Agreement on 2050 targets, a specific date for when emissions should peak and more detailed text on mechanisms such as REDD+ are also required.

Most commentators are demanding that all this be converted into an international legally binding agreement. While I tend to agree, we must not forget the other option of making agreements between a smaller number of the most polluting countries. Given the problems encountered in the UN negotiations process so far, this may be a worst case scenario backup solution.

While we at SCCF are not directly involved in lobbying the government to make these changes (many others are performing this role well – including our Chairman who is hosting the Post-Copenhagen debate in the House of Lords this week), we have certainly been re-motivated to keep going with our core work. The development of emission reduction projects is more important now than ever before – particularly when we can leverage our initial action to increase the total level of reductions achieved. Also, as the institutional framework for emission reduction projects evolves, we would like to show that projects can work, and be profitable, in unpopular and less accessible environments. Our education programme also continues to be important as we are reminded that this is a long-term challenge that we face.

Finally, after being reminded of enduring public scepticism and apathy about climate change, I now see a growing role for us as communicators of both the science and policy. If we are ultimately to turn the corner on the climate change challenge, we will need people to keep voting for ambitious solutions.

Olivia Palin, SCCF

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[1] The Fourth Assessment Report of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007)

[2] Schroeder, H. & Lovell, H. (forthcoming) The Role of Side Events in the UNFCCC Climate Negotiations